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Where do politically activist football supporters come from? What are the social conditions under 
which they are successfully recruited and mobilised? This article answers those questions by 
analysing a unique dataset of more than 43 thousand members of Our Hajduk – the association 
of supporters of the Croatian club Hajduk Split – as well as a host of data on the communities they 
live in. The analysis shows that Our Hajduk thrives exactly in the same areas where most other 
social, civil, and political organisations thrive: among the more educated and more 
socioeconomically successful. Most importantly, the analysis shows that the pattern of Our Hajduk 
membership closely follows the patterns of political affiliation and participation in Croatia’s 
electoral arena and is guided by the opposition to political players who have dominated Croatian 
football and turned it into a social field marked by corruption and mismanagement. 
 
On a warm November day in 2014, more than thirty thousand people assembled to protest on 
the seaside promenade in Croatia’s second largest city of Split. The proximate cause of their 
protest were the events of the previous week when the supporters of the local football club 
Hajduk Split were not allowed to enter the Maksimir stadium in the country’s capital of Zagreb 
prior to Hajduk’s match with their arch-rivals Dinamo Zagreb. Hajduk’s players refused to play the 
game without their supporters and the match was summarily registered as a 3-0 win for Dinamo, 
which prompted outrage not only among hardcore Hajduk supporters. This episode, however, 
was just the final straw in a complex relationship involving Hajduk, Dinamo, the Croatian Football 
Federation (HNS), and the national authorities, which had been building up in acrimony and 
conflict since Croatia’s independence in 1991. The motivation of the assembled demonstrators – 
a diverse mix of ultras and families of all generations – was perfectly captured by an ardent 
supporter of Hajduk Benjamin Perasović who addressed them that afternoon from a makeshift 
stage: “What we have here is the beginning of a social movement against injustice, mafia, and 
corruption… We are calling for the depersonalisation, depoliticisation, decriminalisation, and 
democratisation of Croatian football!” (Alač, 2014) 
 
The protest changed little in Croatian football which is to this day marked by corruption, match 
fixing, financial mismanagement, and political connections. Nevertheless, Perasović was correct. 
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The protest did serve as one of the foundations of a social movement of Hajduk supporters for a 
clean and fair club, league, football federation, and politics in general. Within a year, supporters 
took over association membership operations from club management and the membership 
figures skyrocketed from about 15 thousand to more than 43 thousand – an impressive number 
in a country of about 4 million inhabitants.  The membership association Our Hajduk (Naš Hajduk 
– NH), which was originally formed in 2011 in an attempt to save the club from bankruptcy and 
meddling by local politicians, intensified and diversified its repertoire of activities, turning them 
overtly political. By doing that, it became not only the essential stakeholder in the club and 
Croatian football in general, but also the flag bearer for the movement of football supporters 
across Europe who are trying to turn football into a prime site of social and political contention. 
Whether by opposing the commercialisation of the sport and the detachment of clubs from their 
original communities, or by mobilising for or against various kinds of political forces and events, 
these supporters – as Dino Numerato (2018: 2) has argued – have given present-day football 
culture a “revolutionary spirit”. 
 
Football has arguably always been political – or at least had the potential of easily turning political. 
The contemporary evolution of a number of associations of football supporters into platforms 
with activist agendas is, however, a relatively new development. Unfortunately, we know little 
about the social foundations of their mobilisation. Where do political football activists come 
from? What are the characteristics of the social environments where they appear and successfully 
mobilise? Sociology of football has made significant strides in describing and explaining the 
evolving phenomena of football fandom and activism, but without much systematic empirical 
engagement with the question of social context. Part of the explanation for this lies in the field 
being dominated by in-depth ethnographic accounts which limit our ability to make broader 
conclusions. This study changes the methodological lens. It quantitatively analyses a unique 
dataset consisting of Our Hajduk membership figures and a host of socioeconomic, demographic, 
and political variables on the level of Croatia’s 556 municipalities in order to relate the literature 
on the sociology of football fandom with the literatures on the social foundations of political 
participation and associational membership. 
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The analysis demonstrates that the pattern of support for Our Hajduk, in addition to following 
the expected spatial, regional, and ethnic/national determinants of support which are embedded 
in the history of the club, also: 1) corresponds to the classical patterns of political participation 
and associational membership in other social fields and geographic and historical contexts; and 
2) closely follows the patterns of political affiliation and participation in Croatia’s electoral arena. 
More specifically, the pattern of support for Our Hajduk has a strong negative relationship with 
the pattern of support for the political forces which have dominated Croatian football for the past 
three decades and turned it into a social field marked by corruption and mismanagement. In 
Croatia, as in many other places, football is a site of political contention with patterns of 
participation not much different than other social fields. 
 
Social foundations of (political) football activism  
Football is rapidly changing. The changes on the pitch, the training ground, and in the boardroom 
have been matched by the changes in the stands. The sociology of football fandom has been 
preoccupied with two aspects of these changes. On the one hand, scholars have recognised the 
shifting demographics and loyalties of football supporters in response to the consumerisation, 
gentrification, and internationalisation of the game across the whole spectrum of countries 
(Kennedy and Kennedy, 2012; Millward, 2011). Football supporters are becoming more diverse 
based on their gender, class, and location not only in West European countries like the UK (Pope, 
2011; Jewel et al., 2014; Perasović and Mustapić, 2017). The ties that bind football clubs to their 
communities – at least at the highest levels of the sport – are being profoundly transformed. On 
the other hand, many authors have also recognised the pushback to the consequences of 
commercialisation by a new class of supporters in a number of countries of different levels of 
economic development and football traditions – a kind of Polanyi’s “double movement” Against 
Modern Football (Kennedy, 2013; Webber, 2015; Numerato, 2018). The commitment of these 
football supporters to the cause – from opposing takeovers of clubs by international investors 
(Dubal, 2010) to organising transnationally in order to enshrine the principles of supporters’ 
participation in football governance (Kennedy and Kennedy, 2012) – has clearly crossed the 
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boundaries of fandom and shifted firmly toward activism, though here we have to note that 
football supporters are becoming increasingly nuanced in their views of the structures of football 
governance and of the role to be played by supporters (García and Llopis-Goig, 2019). 
 
While some question to which extent the activism of football supporters goes beyond the 
sociocultural domain of sport or fits into any sort of party politics (Cleland et al., 2018), its political 
character cannot be denied. Contemporary football supporter activists are political because they 
clearly aim to intentionally alter the existing relations of political power and bring about social 
change (Brough and Shresthova, 2012), even if their activities are often circumscribed by the 
domains of their clubs, local communities, or the sport. They do that through collective action 
which is often unmatched in numbers in any other sphere of political or social activism (Millward 
and Poulton, 2014). This collective action is fuelled by continuous mobilisation which is most often 
highly intensive because it strikes at the core of participants’ social lives (Numerato, 2015). 
Indeed, football supporter activism is political exactly because it is directed at something that is 
much more than “a form of consumption” (Cleland et al., 2018: 16). 
 
The political character of contemporary football supporter activists should not be surprising, 
considering the origins and nature of football clubs and their historical sources of popular 
support. Most football clubs are identity markers for their communities. They also provide 
structures and mechanisms through which many individuals – most often young men – get 
socialised into a collective: ethnic, national, class, or even religious or political (Mason, 1988). 
Actively participating in a community of football club supporters is for these people not a marginal 
experience, but a “regular, structuring part of their existence that enables them to feel belonging 
in the relative disorder of contemporary social formations” (Brown et al., 2008: 308). All of these 
defining characteristics of being a football supporter – identity, community, socialisation – are 
inherently political. Or, rather, they give football the potential for easy transformation from a 
relatively autonomous social field (Bourdieu, 1991) into a prime site of political contention – 
particularly in times of crisis, whether on the level of individual clubs (García and Welford, 2015) 
or whole polities (Zaimakis, 2016; Cleland et al., 2018). 
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Football clubs and football fandom are, however, human constructs, which means that their 
political nature is highly individualised. No two clubs shape or are shaped by two identical 
communities. If we look at the historical roots of most football clubs, we often note the tension 
or competition between two sets of social phenomena – class and nation (Giulianotti, 1999). This 
does not mean that clubs do not straddle these barriers, or that they do not draw support from a 
variety of social strata, or that their foundational sources of support cannot be based on regional, 
local, or religious identities. After all, football clubs are not like the potentially travelling franchises 
in American sports but are strongly tied to a defined geographic space. And these geographic 
spaces are often homes to demographically complex and changing communities. Nevertheless, it 
is fair to say that different clubs draw support from and symbolise different kinds of communities 
which may be defined geographically, nationally, or in class terms. The positioning of their 
supporters on any sort of spectrum – political or otherwise – can, therefore, vary dramatically 
from club to club (or even from terrace to terrace of the same stadium), as well as from the past 
to the present. 
 
Although we must be cognisant of these idiosyncrasies inherent to all football clubs and their 
supporters, the empirical challenge before us remains. We need to answer the question: where 
do football supporters in general, and politically activist football supporters in particular, come 
from? In other words, what are the social conditions under which they are successfully recruited 
and mobilised? As Kevin Dixon has argued, much of the scholarship on football supporter culture 
classifies football supporters “as either products of social structures or agents of post-modernity” 
without much attempt at exposing the interplay between agency and structure (2012: 334). This 
is a fair assessment, but one that misses the fact that both ends of this theoretical range have 
limited empirical foundations. This, of course, does not mean that there have not been 
tremendously insightful, usually ethnographic, studies of football supporters which have given us 
a first-hand view into the origins of their fandom or even activism in different cultural contexts 
(e.g. Bleakney and Darby, 2018; Dixon, 2012; Dubal, 2010; Gilbert, 2018; Hodges, 2018; Lalić and 
Pilić, 2011; Totten, 2015). Exceptional advances have particularly been made by scholars 
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employing relational sociology frameworks who have exposed the constant process of building 
and rebuilding of often transnational networks of football communities (Cleland et al. 2018). 
Nevertheless, the disciplinary methodological boundaries, as well as objective obstacles to data 
collection, have precluded generations of sociologists of sport from shedding systematic empirical 
light on the aforementioned question: where do (politically activist) football supporters come 
from? 
 
If we accept the idea that supporter activism is a form of both cultural and political participation 
(Brough and Shresthova, 2012), which is the view espoused in this article, then that opens up the 
prospect of relating the literature on the sociology of football and sport fandom with the vast 
literatures on the politics and sociology of political participation, associational membership, and 
social movements. Does membership in football supporters’ groups follow the same patterns as 
memberships in political organisations and various associations of the civil society? In two areas 
the findings of the two literatures should be largely in agreement. First, as argued above, being a 
football club supporter is decisively defined by spatial, national/ethnic, and regional belonging. 
The same can be said of political participation and associational membership as well, with a long 
strand of scholarship finding the patterns of these social phenomena dependent on the patterns 
of ethnic, national, or regional belonging, community size, and spatial distance (Curtis et al., 1992; 
Gallego, 2007; Morales, 2009). And second, in spite of recent evolution in this regard, football is 
a social field still strongly dominated by men, just as the levels of political participation and 
associational membership continue to be higher among men, despite contemporary shifts in 
trends in some polities (Burns et al., 1997; Dalton, 2013). Things get more complicated, however, 
when we consider other determinants of political participation such as education, socio-economic 
wellbeing, and political orientation. The fact that higher levels of education and socio-economic 
wellbeing lead to higher levels of political participation and associational membership is perhaps 
one of the strongest empirical findings in social science (Verba and Nie, 1972; Verba et al, 1993). 
In spite of a wave of scholarship demonstrating the broad appeal of football and the class and 
educational/professional diversity of the various coalitions and networks of activist supporters 
(Giulianotti, 2002; Cleland et al., 2018; Numerato, 2018), this relationship between educational 
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and socio-economic performance and political activity is in tension with some of the classics of 
the sociology of football (Giulianotti, 1999: 40-47) and with the conventional popular view of the 
social foundations of football fandom. 
 
Is football the favourite pastime dominantly in underprivileged communities? Similarly, do 
politically activist football supporters’ groups mobilise more successfully in such communities, 
perhaps due to the increased commodification of football and the fact they are being priced out 
of their clubs’ activities?  Or do (politically activist) football supporters’ groups thrive exactly in 
the same areas where most other social, civil, and political organisations thrive – i.e. among the 
more educated and more socioeconomically successful? Finally, and most intriguingly, what is the 
relationship between the patterns of being (politically activist) football supporters and the 
general patterns of political participation, particularly in cultural contexts where football is a 
highly politicised and contested social sphere? We simply do not know the answers to these 
questions. This is the case partly because contemporary sociology of football has largely focused 
on different issues, partly because it has remained disconnected from the literatures on social 
and political participation and associational membership, and partly because it has been 
dominated by methodological approaches which do not allow for empirically robust cross-case 
comparisons. Ethnographies of football fandom and activism have obviously been very useful 
tools of descriptive inference. In order to move beyond description, however, the field would 
benefit from – to borrow Sidney Tarrow’s (1995) phrase – some “quantitative bones to its 
qualitative flesh.” 
 
Our Hajduk and the struggle for clean football in Croatia 
Organised football supporters in post-communist Europe – particularly in Southeast Europe – are 
often perceived by their publics as violent nationalists with connections to various forms of 
criminal activity (Djordjević and Pekić, 2018). This is a tendency Andrew Hodges (2016) aptly 
labelled “nesting intra-orientalism” where the hooligans represent the internal Balkan other in a 
supposedly Europeanising society. While shaking this image off has proven difficult for many 
football supporters’ groups when it comes to their portrayals in the popular press and media, 
8 
recent academic literature paints a more nuanced picture of their motivations and strategies. 
Many authors have recognised the changing nature of the culture of football supporters in this 
region and the decreasing role of violence in their repertoire of activities. Scholars have also 
recognised the importance of temporal and social context in the unique, though related, paths 
football supporters’ cultures have taken during the past two decades (Dubal, 2010; Kossakowski, 
2017). Over the course of that time, we have witnessed an evolution of a number of different 
forms of football fandom in the region, perhaps none more noteworthy than the politically 
proactive football supporters’ groups campaigning for their clubs, football, and politics to be clean 
of corruption and clientelism (Tregoures and Šantek, 2018). Among those groups, the association 
of supporters of Hajduk Split, Our Hajduk, has proven to be the most prominent and successful. 
 
The association of supporters Our Hajduk grew out of the ultras supporters’ group Torcida in 
2011, at a time when the club was on the verge of bankruptcy with debts of more than €15 million 
after years of mismanagement by local political powerholders. Since the majority of the club 
shares were owned by the city of Split after the club’s restructuring in 2008, Torcida organised a 
campaign of protests and public performances in order to pressure the city council to co-sign a 
€4 million loan to the club needed to avoid insolvency, as well as to organise elections for the 
club’s supervisory board which would be open to active members of the new supporters’ 
association (Lalić and Pilić, 2011). This was a controversial proposal strongly resisted by the local 
establishment which had used the club as a form of political capital. Nevertheless, Torcida and 
Our Hajduk succeeded in their demands, likely because politicians believed the debt-ridden and 
poorly managed club was no longer a resource worth fighting for. The club was thus saved and 
set on the slow and painful course toward financial recovery. This story of supporters organising 
in reaction to club crisis and mismanagement is in many ways typical of similar supporter 
associations in other cultural contexts (García and Welford, 2015). Nevertheless, it is notable for 
the success of active or activist supporters at overcoming the apathy of a generally passive and 
disillusioned body of fans which has hampered supporters’ achievements at other clubs (Cleland 
and Dixon, 2015). 
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From these ad hoc crisis-driven roots, however, Our Hajduk grew into an association with a much 
broader agenda. To use Herbert Blumer’s terminology, applied by Millward and Poulton (2014) 
to great effect in their study of F.C. United of Manchester supporters, Our Hajduk passed from its 
social movement stage of unrest to the stage of “formalization”. Its leadership is staffed by highly 
educated and professionally successful supporters who thus defy the popular stereotypes 
associated with football supporters in the region. The association fought against its passive status 
vis-à-vis club management and acquired the most active stakeholder role possible (Cleland 2010). 
It held three rounds of elections to the club supervisory board – in 2011, 2015, and 2018 – and 
embarked on a still-ongoing campaign for the acquisition of club shares (in 2019 NH holds about 
25% of Hajduk shares), giving the association status not only as a stakeholder, but also as the 
second largest official club shareholder after the city of Split which holds 65% of the shares. In 
other words, within several years, Our Hajduk members transformed their position in club 
management from passive to active, and their status in the life of the club from that of customers 
to that of stakeholders and shareholders (García and Welford, 2015). After several years under 
NH-elected supervisory boards and new club management, the club’s debts were finally paid off 
largely with income from transfers of young players and, as mentioned above, the membership 
in the supporters’ association skyrocketed to more than 43 thousand in 2016, even though Hajduk 
did not enjoy much sporting success. 
 
Of course, not all 43 thousand members joined the NH for the same reasons or with the same 
level of commitment. For example, about 5 thousand members took part in the 2018 elections 
for the club supervisory board, and Hajduk’s home attendance – though by far the highest in 
Croatia’s First League – hovers at around 11 thousand. In some respects, NH could be considered 
as a form of a “tertiary association” where a mix of some active and mostly passive members 
share ties to common symbols or ideals, but not necessarily to each other (Putnam, 1995). 
Moreover, membership in NH has in many ways become synonymous with support for the club 
(though the relationship does not work vice-versa as well, i.e. a substantial minority of Hajduk 
supporters are not supporters of NH or its platform), so disentangling one from the other is 
virtually impossible. Nevertheless, considering the clearly political nature of the NH platform, its 
10 
ability – together with Torcida – to draw huge crowds when needed as in the case of the 2014 
protest, and the repertoire of its activities, the empirical value in explaining the level of its support 
remains. 
 
Because, the activities of Our Hajduk have not been limited to managing the elections to the club 
supervisory board or the acquisition of club shares. Hajduk competes in a league run by the 
Croatian Football Association which is notorious for corruption on all levels. The HNS institutions, 
including the referee organisation whose leaders have been convicted to multi-year sentences 
for match fixing and extortion in 2014 and 2017 (Jakelić, 2017), have been strongly dominated by 
the cadre recruited by Croatia’s largest party, the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), and loyal to 
the ruler of Hajduk’s principal rival Dinamo Zagreb, Zdravko Mamić. Mamić has also been 
convicted in 2018 to a multi-year sentence for tax evasion and transfer fraud but avoided arrest 
by escaping to Bosnia and Herzegovina (Patković, 2018). This intertwining of political influence of 
the HDZ (which has dominated most HNS administrations since Croatia’s independence) and the 
financial interests of Zdravko Mamić and his network of associates has been the staple of Croatian 
football during the past decade and a half (Lalić, 2018; Vukušić and Miošić, 2018). It was also the 
principal target of Our Hajduk legal actions and protest campaigns directed at the public, media, 
and state institutions, which culminated in the active participation of NH members and legal 
experts in the drafting of the new Law on Sport (Tregoures and Šantek, 2018). The Law was 
officially promulgated in 2015 by the parliament dominated by the Social Democratic Party (SDP) 
and with strong HDZ opposition (Hrvatski Sabor, 2015). The law was supposed to free sports 
associations and clubs from political meddling and to bring transparency to their financial 
operations. Although it proved to be largely toothless, the law solidified the image of NH and 
Torcida as champions of sport and politics clean of corruption and clientelism both domestically 
and abroad. It also solidified their image as the only force strong enough to stand up to the HDZ 
– which went on to form the government after the 2015 and 2016 parliamentary elections – in 
such an important site of political contention as football. 
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Data, method, and empirical propositions 
As mentioned above, Our Hajduk was formed in 2011, but the critical period in its existence was 
the year after the November 2014 protest. That is when the association took over the running of 
the membership operations from the football club and, as a result, its membership for 2016 went 
from about 15 thousand to more than 43 thousand. In early 2017, the NH leadership allowed 
access to an anonymised list of its members. Access was granted because the NH itself wanted to 
better understand the geographic pattern of its support. 34,521 members were established to be 
residents of Croatia and were allocated to one of Croatia’s 556 municipalities based on their place 
of residence. Their geographic distribution, shown in Figure 1, demonstrates that NH is strongest 
in Dalmatia, while notably present in all regions of Croatia. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
In the Croatian context, municipalities are the smallest geographic units on which a wealth of 
economic, political, and sociodemographic data is collected. With the median population of just 
under 3000 and the extensive level of administrative power they have, municipalities represent 
the foundational building blocks of Croatian social organisation and are meaningful communities 
in the truest sense of that word. This makes them the most ideal units of analysis for this study. 
Quantitative analyses of aggregate-level data have been a staple of research in virtually all social 
sciences – from the study of economic development, through the study of elections, to the study 
of membership in various associations such as labour unions. Here it is important to note that 
while quantitative analyses of aggregate-level data are ideal as means of modelling socio-
economic, demographic, spatial, or temporal context, their results should not be mistaken for 
individual-level findings. In other words, we need to be cognisant of the perils of ecological fallacy, 
while recognising that the design of this study and the data available are arguably perfectly suited 
for the questions posed by this article. 
 
Identifying potential contextual determinants of support for an association of supporters of a 
football club (politically activist or not) is clearly contingent on the club’s history and social status 
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which varies dramatically from club to club. Being cognisant of the contextual realities of Hajduk 
Split and its supporters, as well as limitations of available data, a set of explanatory variables – 
here listed in Table 1 – was chosen and collected from the Croatian Bureau of Statistics, the Tax 
Authority, and the State Electoral Commission. They represent the most comprehensive way of 
addressing the research questions and may offer guidance in understanding the contextual 
dynamics of support for a football club like Hajduk Split, as well as for an association like Our 
Hajduk which has a clear social and political agenda. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
The first four explanatory variables on that list – Poljud distance, Maksimir distance, Dalmatians, 
and Football generation – can be thought of as the geographic and demographic baseline, 
capturing the dualist nature of Croatia’s football “market” (i.e. the dominance of the rivalry 
between Hajduk Split and Dinamo Zagreb) and the principal target population of Hajduk 
supporters: young men and those born in Dalmatia. 
 
The following batch of five explanatory variables – Settlement size, Croats, Religious, Education, 
and War – capture some of the most studied socio-demographic factors influencing different 
types of political participation and associational membership.  Here the assumption is that the 
levels of NH membership would be negatively related with the size of communities, consistent 
with findings in other social contexts (Curtis et al., 1992); positively related to the proportion of 
Croats in the municipal population considering Hajduk’s strong connection to Croatian identity 
and ethnic minorities exhibiting lower levels of political participation and associational 
membership (Diehl and Blohm, 2001; Leighley and Vedlitz, 1999; Gallego, 2007); positively related 
to the level of education in the municipality considering the clearly positive influence of education 
on associational membership and political participation, regardless of social or historical context 
(Hillygus, 2005; Mayer, 2011), and considering the nature of the NH social and political message; 
and negatively related to the communities’ exposure to war violence, likely due to the torn ties 
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of social inclusion and involvement and due to greater levels of overall social malaise and apathy 
(Glaurdić and Vuković, 2016a).  
 
Two variables capture the economic wellbeing of the municipal population – Income and 
Unemployment. Stronger job market performance and general affluence have been shown to be 
mostly conducive to higher levels of political participation and associational membership (Verba, 
Schlozman, and Brady, 1995; Curtis et al., 2001). Moreover, the annual NH membership fee of 
100 Croatian kunas (about €13) does not present a real barrier to entry even for the most 
financially challenged potential members. The expectation here – in contrast to the popular 
misconception of football being the preferred pastime in economically disadvantaged areas and 
an outlet for this population’s social and economic frustrations – is that at least Unemployment 
would be negatively related to NH membership as higher rates of unemployment can lead to 
withdrawal from political and associational activity due to apathy and a diminished sense of 
political efficacy (Gallego, 2008). 
 
Football is, despite recent shifts, still a male-dominated sport, particularly when it comes to the 
deeply committed supporters. The interaction between gender, family, and football is, however, 
an empirically under-researched question. Do (predominantly male) football supporters come 
from areas with strong traditional gender roles and family structures? Modelling these dynamics 
with census data is difficult. Here we use four variables which capture the state of gender roles 
and the prevalence of and commitment to traditional family structures: Dissimilarity index, 
Female workforce, Married, and Referendum “No”. Three things need to be noted here. First, 
gender occupational dissimilarity, captured by Dissimilarity index, has been shown to be a solid 
predictor of the population’s opposition to progressive views of gender roles and family 
structures and ideologically conservative politicians (McVeigh and Sobolewski, 2007; McVeigh 
and Diaz, 2009). Second, the variable Married is a standard measure of the prevalence of 
traditional family structures and a solid predictor of higher levels of associational membership 
(Morales, 2009). And third, the variable Referendum “No” represents the proportion of the 
municipality’s adult population which voted against the constitutional definition of marriage as a 
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union between a man and a woman in Croatia’s 2013 referendum promoted by rightist groups 
(Glaurdić and Vuković, 2016b).  This variable perfectly captures the dividing line between the 
traditionalist and progressive views of gender and family. Conventional view of football 
supporters – in the case of Hajduk grounded also in a history of homophobic actions by the 
members of Torcida (Perasović and Mustapić, 2017) – would suggest that Our Hajduk should be 
positively related to Dissimilarity index and Married, while negatively related to Female workforce 
and Referendum “No”. 
 
Although a non-partisan association of supporters of a football club, Our Hajduk – in contrast to 
many similar associations in Europe, particularly in the UK (Cleland et al. 2018) – ultimately is an 
organisation with a clear social and political agenda that goes beyond football. It is thus 
imperative to establish to which extent its pattern of support corresponds to the general pattern 
of political participation and allegiance of the Croatian population. Fortunately, as NH was 
running its large membership campaign throughout 2016, Croatia was in a political crisis which 
culminated with the national parliamentary election in September of that year. Croatian parties 
do not fit neatly into ideological moulds, especially when it comes to economic policy. However, 
they are clearly delineated when it comes to their attitudes toward sport, with the HDZ being the 
only major electoral competitor actively defending the corrupt status quo in Croatian football. 
The variable HDZ vote thus represents the proportion of votes won by the HDZ in the 2016 
elections. The expectation would be that the pattern of its support is negatively related to the 
pattern of NH membership, in spite of the fact that the region of Dalmatia is actually one of HDZ’s 
traditional strongholds. 
 
We also add the variables Turnout and Invalid vote as proxies for the general state of political 
participation and interest of the local population. Turnout is the standard measure of political 
participation (Cox, 2015), whereas the proportion of invalid ballots has recently been identified 
as an appropriate measure of voter anger and displeasure with the party system offerings (Moral, 
2016). Our expectation here would be that Turnout would have an influence on NH membership 
which would be conditional on party allegiances. The NH should not do well in areas with highly 
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motivated HDZ voters, but it should do well in areas with highly motivated anti-HDZ voters. 
Similarly, considering that NH membership is a form of expression of faith that something can be 
changed, the expectation would be that NH membership would have a negative relationship with 
Invalid vote as it is a sign of a more destructive, rather than constructive, attitude toward politics. 
The descriptive statistics of all variables are shown in Table 2. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Since the dependent variable, NH members, is a proportional variable distributed on a unit 
interval (0, 1), ordinary least squares (OLS) was not an option. Instead, what is employed is the 
fractional logit model recommended by Papke and Wooldridge (1996) which is attractive because 
it requires no transformations of data at the extreme values and provides the best fit for the 
tested models. Heteroscedasticity is controlled for by applying a robust estimation of standard 
errors and possible problems of multicollinearity are dealt with by computing variance inflation 
factors (VIF) for all explanatory variables. Their values are well below the maximum 
recommended value of 10 (Marquardt, 1970), with the mean value of 3.4. 
 
Lack of multicollinearity notwithstanding, determining the effects of the four different clusters of 
explanatory variables (socio-demographic, economic, family/gender, and political) is a challenge 
because all these variables are intertwined and connected. This can be particularly problematic 
when disentangling the effects of the political cluster of variables which can be argued to be 
causally “shallower” than the socio-demographic or the economic (Kitschelt, 2003). This is why, 
in addition to employing the full model with all explanatory variables, what is also tested is the 
impact of the four different clusters independently (always including the geographic and 
demographic baseline). This approach does not expose the mechanism behind the pattern of NH 
mobilisation, but it is the most appropriate methodological approach if we wish to understand 
the comparative explanatory power of the four clusters of independent variables. 
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Results and interpretations 
The results of the analyses are presented in Table 3, with each column representing one of the 
seven models: 1) the model using baseline demographic variables which are also the foundation 
for all other models, 2) the model highlighting the five socio-demographic variables, 3) the 
economic model highlighting the effects of economic wellbeing, 4) the model capturing the 
effects of variables related to gender and family, 5) the model relating the pattern of NH 
membership to the pattern of political/electoral participation, 6) a variant of the political 
participation model highlighting the interactive effect of turnout and political orientation, and 
finally 7) the full model. The table reports average marginal effects because of their easier and 
more useful interpretation, since they predict the change in dependent variable as a unit change 
in the independent variable (Angrist and Pischke, 2009: 103). 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
The results of all models immediately make it clear that the choice of the four baseline variables 
– Poljud distance, Maksimir distance, Dalmatians, and Football generation – was a sensible one. 
These four variables are statistically significant on the 1% level in the expected direction 26 out 
of 28 times. In the interpretation of the effect sizes, it is most prudent to use the variables’ 
standard deviation figures, here presented in Table 2. Looking at the baseline Model 1, we can 
say that one standard deviation increase in the distance of the municipal centre from the Hajduk 
stadium (i.e. 89.79 km) implies 3.3 fewer NH members per 1000 municipal inhabitants. The same 
one deviation increase in the distance from the Dinamo Zagreb stadium (87.37 km) leads to 4 
additional NH members per 1000 municipal inhabitants. One deviation increase in the number of 
municipal inhabitants born in Dalmatia, on the other hand, results in 4.8 additional NH members, 
and a similar increase in the proportion of young men in the municipal population leads to 1.2 
extra NH members per 1000 municipal inhabitants. The average number of NH members per 1000 
municipal inhabitants is 8.7, so these effects can be considered as quite substantial. Since 
coefficients for these four variables do not vary dramatically across all seven models, we can say 
that these baseline model effects are a rather solid overall estimate, and with the R2 value of 
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0.553, we can also say that the baseline model does reasonably well in explaining the pattern of 
NH support. In other words, this pattern is – as expected – highly contingent on space and the 
demographic supply of ‘raw material’ needed for a successful association of football supporters. 
 
The overall strength of the baseline model notwithstanding, however, the remaining six models 
all offer important insights and improvements. In the socio-demographic Model 2, we can find 
support for our three propositions regarding the effects of the size of community, ethnic 
belonging, and education on the level of NH membership. The level of support for NH is – as 
expected – higher in smaller communities, communities with fewer ethnic minorities, and 
communities with a better educated population. In line with Hajduk’s strong association with 
Croatian national heritage and in line with the literature on the sociology of political participation 
of ethnic minorities (Diehl and Blohm, 2001; Leighley and Vedlitz, 1999; Gallego, 2007), Our 
Hajduk enjoys higher levels of support in municipalities with higher proportions of ethnic Croats. 
In contrast to popular notions of the pattern of support for football clubs, NH enjoys higher 
support exactly in communities whose inhabitants perform better on the education measure. This 
finding is also supported in the economic Model 3, where the level of NH support is negatively 
related to unemployment. If we use the coefficients in models 2 and 3, we can say that one 
standard deviation increase in education leads to 1.7 additional NH members, and one standard 
deviation decrease in the rate of unemployment leads to 3.4 additional NH members per 1000 
municipal inhabitants. Simply put, the pattern of support for Our Hajduk follows the general 
pattern of associational membership and participation identified in a variety of other social fields. 
It does not correspond to the commonly held stereotypes of football supporters coming from 
socioeconomically and educationally underprivileged communities. 
 
Model 4, on the other hand, tests the relationship between the pattern of NH membership and 
the variables capturing gender and family dynamics in Croatian municipalities. Two variables 
capturing traditional gender roles – Dissimilarity index and Female workforce – remain 
insignificant, suggesting that NH supporters do not come from communities disproportionately 
marked by economic gender segregation. On the other hand, two variables capturing family 
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relations do reach statistical significance on the 1% level and have substantively important effects. 
One standard deviation increase in the proportion of married people in the adult population leads 
to 2.2 additional NH members per 1000 municipal inhabitants. More interestingly, one standard 
deviation increase in the vote against the constitutional definition of marriage as a union between 
a man and a woman in the 2013 referendum leads to 2.6 additional NH members. In other words, 
Our Hajduk succeeds in communities with traditional family structures, but whose inhabitants 
actively oppose socially regressive family policies. The higher level of NH support in municipalities 
with higher proportions of married inhabitants is in line with the literature’s findings on the 
greater incidence of associational membership among married adults (Morales, 2009). The close 
relationship with the 2013 referendum findings, on the other hand, provides an important caveat 
to the narratives of football supporters and homophobia even though it is likely a signifier of the 
fact that the referendum campaign was heavily politicised and that it reflected the standing 
political cleavages between the principal political parties (Glaurdić and Vuković, 2016b). 
 
This interpretation is indeed borne out by the findings presented in models 5 and 6. As Model 5 
shows, the membership in Our Hajduk is negatively related to the level of support for the HDZ. 
Moreover, it is negatively related to the proportion of invalid votes. As hypothesised in the 
previous section, NH membership is not only a sign of support for Hajduk, but also a form of 
expression of faith that something can be changed in the club and in Croatian football which has 
been dominated by the toxic influence of the HDZ. Since the spoiling of ballots is a sign of a more 
destructive attitude toward politics (Moral, 2016), Model 5 supports the proposition that 
membership in NH is a form of constructive opposition to the HDZ. Model 6, on the other hand, 
goes even further in demonstrating the close connection in the pattern of NH support with the 
pattern of conventional political participation in Croatia. It shows that the relationship between 
the HDZ vote and NH membership is conditional on turnout. In other words, where the vote for 
HDZ is low – higher turnout/political participation has a positive impact on NH membership. And 
where the vote for the HDZ is high – higher turnout/political participation has a negative impact 
on NH membership.  
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Most importantly, this relationship ‘survives’ in the full model which boasts a solid R2 of 0.687. As 
can be observed from Model 7 results, in addition to the baseline variables capturing space and 
regional belonging, only the variables Croats and Unemployment remain statistically significant, 
together with the conditional relationship between Turnout and HDZ vote. Therefore, we can 
safely say that the geographic pattern of support for NH primarily depends on: 1) spatial closeness 
to Hajduk Split and its principal rivals Dinamo Zagreb, 2) Dalmatian and Croatian identity of the 
local population, 3) economic wellbeing of the local population, and 4) the pattern of political 
participation and affiliation with the HDZ. To better understand the exact nature of this 
relationship of NH membership to the pattern of political/electoral participation and affiliation, 
Figure 2 shows the marginal effects of turnout on NH membership conditional on the level of 
support for the HDZ. The results are clear: Our Hajduk thrives in areas with mobilised anti-HDZ 
voters, and it struggles in areas with mobilised HDZ voters. Simply put, the NH is an association 
of football supporters whose clear political agenda for football, sports, and politics clear of 
corruption and clientelism attracts and repels people from communities with distinct political 
commitments. 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
Conclusions and directions for future research 
The aim of this article was to identify the social context under which (politically activist) football 
supporters are successfully recruited and mobilised. More specifically, the aim was to answer 
whether the pattern of support for a football club like Hajduk Split or an association of football 
supporters like Our Hajduk follows the patterns of associational membership in other social 
spheres, or whether it conforms to the commonly held and biased views of where football 
supporters come from. The aim was also to establish whether support for a football club 
supporter association can be seen as a form of political or politicised activity. Aggregate-level data 
analysis has its limitations and we must be careful not to fall into the traps of ecological fallacy 
and extrapolate individual-level conclusions from our findings. Moreover, the limited nature of 
Our Hajduk membership data does not allow us to make more nuanced conclusions about the 
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motivations and commitments of different NH members. Regardless of these limitations, 
however, the article’s principal aims have been fulfilled. 
 
First, the analysis shows that the pattern of support for Our Hajduk follows the patterns of 
associational membership in other social spheres and different geographical and historical 
contexts. In agreement with a long line of research on associational membership, the analysis 
presented here shows that the level of support for Our Hajduk has a clearly positive relationship 
with the communities’ level of education, socioeconomic well-being, as well as presence of the 
society’s ethnic/national majority. In contrast to common stereotypes of football supporters’ 
communities and some of the classics of the sociology of football, we can say that at least this 
football supporters’ group thrives exactly in the same areas where most other social, civil, and 
political organisations thrive – i.e. among the more educated and more socioeconomically 
successful. 
 
And second, the pattern of support for Our Hajduk clearly suggests that its membership can 
indeed be seen as a form of political or politicised activity. The analysis shows that the level of NH 
support has a negative relationship with the proportion of spoiled ballots in Croatia’s elections. 
This implies that Our Hajduk succeeds where people believe in constructive opposition to the 
political powerholders. More importantly, the NH membership figures also have a negative 
relationship with the level of support for the Croatian Democratic Union – the party which has 
dominated Croatian football for the past three decades and helped turn it into a hotbed of 
corruption. This relationship is additionally conditioned by the level of electoral turnout, which 
means that the pattern of NH support closely follows the complex pattern of political participation 
and affiliation in Croatian electoral politics. In other words, the pattern of support for NH suggests 
that membership in this association can be seen as an active expression of constructive opposition 
to the system of crony capitalism the HDZ has built in football and beyond. 
 
Research presented in this article must be supplemented by solid research on the individual level 
which would expose the dynamics of allegiance to a politically activist football supporters’ group 
21 
such as Our Hajduk in complete detail. Nevertheless, the benefits of the methodological approach 
employed here are obvious. It has allowed us to make more general and reliable conclusions, and 
it has opened more direct lines of communication between the literature on the sociology of 
football and the broader literatures on associational membership and political participation. The 
lessons of this study for our understanding of the evolution of football fandom and activism can 
and should be tested in other social and geographic contexts. A wealth of new forms of large-
scale data on supporters’ and activists’ interaction with football and politics is being generated 
daily. If we wish to move beyond descriptive inference and truly grasp the role football plays in 
contemporary societies, we must diversify our methodological toolbox and use all the 
opportunities these data offer. Sociology of football fandom can only benefit from adding some 
“quantitative bones” to its body of scholarship built almost exclusively by qualitative methods. 
 
  
22 
References 
 
Alač, Z (2014) Poslušajte govor navijača Bena. Index.hr. 1 December. Available at: 
https://www.index.hr/sport/clanak/Poslusajte-govor-navijaca-Bena-Nasim-nogometom-
vladaju-kralj-njegova-obitelj-i-huligani-u-odijelima/787355.aspx (Accessed on 15 March 
2019). 
Angrist JD and Pischke J-S (2009) Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricist’s Companion. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Bleakney J and Darby P (2018) The pride of east Belfast: Glentoran Football Club and the 
(re)production of Ulster unionist identities in Northern Ireland. International Review for 
the Sociology of Sport 53(8): 975–996. 
Bourdieu P (1991) Sport and social class. In: Mukerji C and Schudson M (eds.) Rethinking 
Popular Culture: Contemporary Perspectives in Cultural Studies. Berkeley: University 
California Press, pp. 357–373. 
Brough M and Shresthova S (2012) Fandom meets activism: Rethinking civic and political 
participation. Transformative Works and Cultures 10. 
Brown A, Crabbe T, and Mellor G (2008) Introduction: Football and community – practical and 
theoretical considerations. Soccer & Society 9(3): 303–312. 
Burns N, Schlozman KL and Verba S (1997) The public consequences of private inequality: Family 
life and citizen participation. American Political Science Review 91(2): 373–389. 
Cleland J (2010) From passive to active: The changing relationship between supporters and 
football clubs. Soccer & Society 11(5): 537-552. 
Cleland J and Dixon K (2015) ‘Black and whiters’: The relative powerlessness of ‘active’ 
supporter organization mobility at English Premier League football clubs. Soccer & Society 
16(4): 540–554. 
Cleland J, Doidge M, Millward P, and Widdop P (2018) Collective Action and Football Fandom: A 
Relational Sociological Approach. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Cox GW (2015) Electoral rules, mobilization, and turnout. Annual Review of Political Science 18: 
49–68. 
Curtis JE, Grabb EG and Baer DE (1992) Voluntary association membership in fifteen countries: A 
comparative analysis. American Sociological Review 57(2): 139–152. 
Curtis JE, Baer DE and Grabb EG (2001) Nations of joiners: Explaining voluntary association 
membership in democratic societies. American Sociological Review 66(6): 783–805. 
Dalton RJ (2013) Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial 
Democracies. Thousand Oaks, CA: CQ Press. 
Diehl C and Blohm M (2001) Apathy, adaptation or ethnic mobilisation? On the political 
attitudes of an excluded group. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 27(3): 401–420. 
Dixon K (2012) Learning the game: Football fandom culture and the origins of practice. 
International Review for the Sociology of Sport 48(3): 334–348. 
Djordjević I and Pekić R (2018) Is there space for the left? Football fans and political positioning 
in Serbia. Soccer & Society 19(3): 355–372. 
Dubal S (2010) The neoliberalization of football: Rethinking neoliberalism through the 
commercialization of the beautiful game. International Review for the Sociology of Sport 
45(2): 123–146. 
23 
Gallego A (2007) Unequal political participation in Europe. International Journal of Sociology 
37(4): 10–25. 
García B and Llopis-Goig R (2019) Club-militants, institutionalists, critics, moderns and globalists: 
A quantitative governance-based typology of football supporters. International Review for 
the Sociology of Sport, online first. 
García B and Welford J (2015) Supporters and football governance, from customers to 
stakeholders: A literature review and agenda for research. Sport Management Review 
18(4): 517-528. 
Gilbert A (2018) Tri vjere, jedna nacija, država Tuzla! Football fans, political protest and the right 
to the city in postsocialist Bosnia–Herzegovina. Soccer & Society 19(3): 373-399. 
Giulianotti R (1999) Football: A Sociology of the Global Game. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. 
Giulianotti R (2002) Supporters, followers, fans, and flaneurs: A taxonomy of spectator identities 
in football. Journal of Sport & Social Issues 26(1): 25–46. 
Glaurdić J and Vuković V (2016a) Voting after war: Legacy of conflict and the economy as 
determinants of electoral support in Croatia. Electoral Studies 42: 135–145. 
Glaurdić J and Vuković V (2016b) Proxy politics, economic protest, or traditionalist backlash: 
Croatia’s referendum on the constitutional definition of marriage. Europe-Asia Studies 68: 
803–825. 
Hillygus DS (2005) The missing link: Exploring the relationship between higher education and 
political engagement. Political Behavior 27(1): 25–47. 
Hodges A (2016) The hooligan as ‘internal’ other? Football fans, ultras culture and nesting intra-
orientalisms. International Review for the Sociology of Sport 51(4): 410–427. 
Hodges A (2018) Fan Activism, Protest and Politics: Ultras in Post-Socialist Croatia. Abingdon, 
UK: Routledge. 
Hrvatski Sabor (2015) Zakon o izmjenama i dopunama zakona o sportu. Narodne novine. 85, 1 
August. 
Jakelić I (2017) Željko Širić pravomoćno je osuđen na četiri godine zatvora. Večernji list. 18 July. 
Available at https://www.vecernji.hr/vijesti/zeljko-siric-pravomocno-osudjen-1183561 
(accessed 10 February 2019). 
Jewell RT, Simmons R and Szymanski S (2014) Bad for business? The effects of hooliganism on 
English professional football clubs. Journal of Sports Economics 15(5): 429–450. 
Jones-Correa MJ and Leal DL (2001) Political participation: Does religion matter? Political 
Research Quarterly 54(4): 751–770. 
Kennedy D (2013) A contextual analysis of Europe’s ultra football supporters movement. Soccer 
& Society 14(2): 132–153. 
Kennedy P and Kennedy D (2012) Football supporters and the commercialization of football: 
Comparative responses across Europe. Soccer and Society 13(3): 327–340. 
Kitschelt H (2003) Accounting for outcomes of post-communist regime diversity: What counts as 
a good cause? In: Ekiert G and Hanson S (eds) Capitalism and Democracy in Central and 
Eastern Europe. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
Kossakowski R (2017) From communist fan clubs to professional hooligans: A history of Polish 
fandom as a social process. Sociology of Sport Journal 34(3): 281–292. 
Lalić D (2018) Nogomet i politika: Povijest i suvremenost međuodnosa u Hrvatskoj. Zagreb: 
Fraktura. 
24 
Lalić D and Pilić D (2011) Torcida: Pogled iznutra. Zagreb: Profil. 
Leighley JE and Vedlitz A (1999) Race, ethnicity, and political participation: Competing models 
and contrasting explanations. Journal of Politics 61(4): 1092–1114. 
Marquardt DW (1970) Generalized inverses, ridge regression and biased linear estimation. 
Technometrics 12. 
Mason T (1988) Sport in Britain. London: Faber & Faber. 
Mayer AK (2011) Does education increase political participation? Journal of Politics 73(3): 633–
645. 
McVeigh R and Sobolewski J M (2007) Red counties, blue counties and occupational segregation 
by sex and race. American Journal of Sociology 113(2): 446–506. 
McVeigh R and Diaz M E D (2009) Voting to ban same-sex marriage: Interests, values, and 
communities. American Sociological Review 74(6): 891–915. 
Millward P (2011) The Global League: Transnational Networks, Social Movements and Sport in 
the New Media Age. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Millward P and Poulton G (2014) Football fandom, mobilisation and Herbert Blumer: A social 
movement analysis of F.C. United of Manchester. Sociology of Sport Journal 31(1): 1–22. 
Moral M (2016) The passive-aggressive voter: The calculus of casting an invalid vote in European 
democracies. Political Research Quarterly 69(4): 732–745. 
Morales L (2009) Joining Political Organisations: Institutions, Mobilisation and Participation in 
Western Democracies. Colchester, UK: ECPR Press. 
Numerato D (2015) Who says “no to modern football?” Italian supporters, reflexivity, and neo-
liberalism. Journal of Sport and Social Issues. 39(2): 120–138. 
Numerato D (2018) Football Fans, Activism and Social Change. Abingdon, UK: Routledge. 
Patković N (2018) Zdravko Mamić osuđen na šest i pol godina zatvora! Jutarnji list. 6 June. 
Available at: https://www.jutarnji.hr/vijesti/crna-kronika/zdravko-mamic-osuden-na-sest-
i-pol-godina-zatvora-braca-mamic-vrbanovic-te-poreznik-pernar-proglaseni-krivima-za-
izvlacenje-novca-iz-dinama/7441848/ (accessed 10 February 2019). 
Perasović B and Mustapić M (2017) Carnival supporters, hooligans, and the ‘Against Modern 
Football’ movement: Life within the ultras subculture in the Croatian context. Sport in 
Society 20(7): 121-136. 
Pope S (2011) Like pulling down Durham Cathedral and building a brothel. International Review 
for the Sociology of Sport 46(4): 471–487. 
Putnam RD (1995) Bowling alone: America’s declining social Capital. Journal of Democracy 6(1): 
65–78. 
Tarrow S (1995) Bridging the quantitative-qualitative divide in political science. American 
Political Science Review 89(2): 471-474. 
Totten M (2016) Football and community empowerment: How FC Sankt Pauli fans organize to 
influence. Soccer & Society 17(5): 703–720. 
Tregoures L and Šantek G (2018) A comparison of two fan initiatives in Croatia: Zajedno za 
Dinamo (Together for Dinamo) and Naš Hajduk (Our Hajduk). Soccer & Society 19(3): 453–
464. 
Verba S and Nie NH (1972) Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality. 
New York: Harper and Row. 
25 
Verba S, Schlozman, KL and Brady HE (1995). Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American 
Politics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Verba S, Schlozman KL, Brady HE and Nie NH (1993) Citizen activity: Who participates? What do 
they say? American Political Science Review 87(2): 303-318. 
Vukušić D and Miošić L (2017) Reinventing and reclaiming football through radical fan practices? 
NK Zagreb 041 and Futsal Dinamo. Soccer & Society, 19(3): 440–452. 
Webber DM (2015) ‘Playing on the break’: Karl Polanyi and the double-movement ‘Against 
Modern Football’. International Review for the Sociology of Sport 52(7): 875–893. 
Zaimakis Y (2016) Football fan culture and politics in modern Greece: The process of fandom 
radicalization during the austerity era. Soccer & Society 19(2): 252-270. 
 
  
26 
Table 1. Variables used 
Variable Description 
NH members Proportion of the population who are members of Naš Hajduk. 
Poljud distance Distance in km of the municipal center from the Poljud Stadium of HNK 
Hajduk Split. 
Maksimir distance Distance in km of the municipal center from the Maksimir Stadium of GNK 
Dinamo Zagreb. 
Dalmatians Number of people born in Dalmatia, per 1000 inhabitants (ln). 
Football generation Proportion of the population who are men aged 15-39. 
Settlement size Weighted average settlement size in municipality (ln). 
Croats Proportion of the population who are Croats. 
Religious Proportion of the population who identify themselves as members of any 
religious group. 
Education Average number of years of education for population older than 15. 
War Number of people who are disabled and whose cause of disability was the 
1991-1995 war for independence, per 1000. 
Income Average monthly net income in Croatian kunas (ln). 
Unemployment Rate of municipal unemployment. 
Dissimilarity index Index of gender occupational dissimilarity. 
Female workforce Proportion of municipal workforce which is female. 
Married Proportion of adult population who are married. 
Referendum “No” Proportion of adult population which voted “No” in the 2013 referendum on 
the constitutional definition of marriage. 
HDZ vote Proportion of the 2016 parliamentary vote won by HDZ. 
Turnout Turnout in the 2016 parliamentary election. 
Invalid votes Proportion of invalid ballots in the 2016 parliamentary election. 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean SD Min Max 
NH members 0.009 0.017 0 0.151 
Poljud distance 216.52 89.79 1.56 334.43 
Maksimir distance 148.27 87.37 2.82 400.40 
Dalmatians 3.033 2.237 0 6.886 
Football generation 0.158 0.016 0.067 0.200 
Settlement size 6.923 1.250 3.810 13.310 
Croats 0.889 0.171 0.018 1 
Religious 0.965 0.037 0.768 1 
Education 9.849 0.872 5.925 12.132 
War 15.38 12.54 0 103.08 
Income 7.522 0.265 6.315 8.086 
Unemployment 0.155 0.093 0.025 0.495 
Dissimilarity index 0.347 0.064 0.128 0.525 
Female workforce 0.416 0.041 0.208 0.506 
Married 0.812 0.035 0.684 0.905 
Referendum “No” 0.084 0.051 0.006 0.262 
HDZ vote 0.392 0.158 0 0.859 
Turnout 0.517 0.060 0.325 0.790 
Invalid votes 0.024 0.011 0.005 0.128 
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Table 3. Analysis results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Baseline Socio-
demographic 
Economic Family/ 
Gender 
Political 
baseline 
Political 
interactive 
Full 
Poljud distance -0.037*** 
(0.010) 
-0.032*** 
(0.010) 
-0.051*** 
(0.010) 
-0.037*** 
(0.009) 
-0.039*** 
(0.010) 
-0.039*** 
(0.010) 
-0.036*** 
(0.009) 
Maksimir distance 0.046*** 
(0.010) 
0.027*** 
(0.008) 
0.050*** 
(0.010) 
0.048*** 
(0.010) 
0.040*** 
(0.009) 
0.041*** 
(0.009) 
0.044*** 
(0.010) 
Dalmatians 2.14*** 
(0.544) 
2.55*** 
(0.561) 
1.36*** 
(0.527) 
1.91*** 
(0.524) 
2.41*** 
(0.563) 
2.31*** 
(0.537) 
1.51*** 
(0.490) 
Football generation 73.55*** 
(21.66) 
62.42* 
(32.04) 
69.62*** 
(20.4) 
44.31 
(27.17) 
67.75*** 
(22.26) 
69.26*** 
(22.54) 
50.80 
(35.20) 
Settlement size  
 
-0.745* 
(0.452) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
-0.321 
(0.460) 
Croats  
 
13.20*** 
(3.47) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
8.32** 
(3.83) 
Religious  
 
-23.25 
(19.4) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
-24.46 
(25.99) 
Education  
 
1.96** 
(0.840) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
0.607 
(0.948) 
War  
 
-0.042 
(0.036) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.047 
(0.032) 
Income  
 
 
 
0.154 
(2.70) 
  
 
 
 
-4.22 
(2.91) 
Unemployment  
 
 
 
-36.64*** 
(9.92) 
  
 
 
 
-27.68*** 
(8.87) 
Dissimilarity index  
 
 
 
 -0.388 
(8.15) 
 
 
 
 
1.88 
(8.58) 
Female workforce  
 
 
 
 17.04 
(13.04) 
 
 
 
 
12.46 
(13.23) 
Married  
 
 
 
 61.48*** 
(18.78) 
 
 
 
 
31.83 
(21.53) 
Referendum “No”    50.74*** 
(10.26) 
  27.56 
(22.15) 
HDZ vote  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-11.49*** 
(2.67) 
38.20* 
(19.57) 
63.60*** 
(19.28) 
Turnout  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.48 
(6.42) 
46.10*** 
(17.49) 
52.11*** 
(17.22) 
HDZ vote X Turnout      -87.65*** 
(33.67) 
-97.66*** 
(31.16) 
Invalid votes  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-124.94*** 
(42.34) 
-119.60*** 
(43.18) 
-43.85 
(54.66) 
Observations 556 556 556 556 556 556 556 
Log pseudolikelihood -19.179 -18.956 -18.953 -18.935 -19.085 -19.059 -18.803 
R-squared 0.553 0.618 0.627 0.637 0.586 0.594 0.687 
Standard errors in parentheses; fractional logit used throughout; coefficients and standard errors multiplied by 
103 for ease of presentation. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
  
29 
 
Figure 1. Geographic distribution of Our Hajduk membership 
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Figure 2. Conditional effect of electoral turnout on NH membership   
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